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[Service-dominant] logic suggests that organizations exist because the entrepreneur, with his or her bundle of skills, is able to (1) envision service that people want and will pay to obtain and (2) integrate together microspecialists to offer and provide this service. In this sense one of the most important op?rant resources in society and the econ omy is the entrepreneurial spirit, and mental skills of the individual entrepreneurs and their collectivity. (Vargo and Lusch 2006, p. 53) Consider the following scenario: A knock on the door. "Good morning, Professor. I was in your modeling course. I just got a job offer to run marketing for a startup. Though uncertain, it looks like an exciting opportu nity, and I hope you can introduce me to some best market ing practices in this setting because I haven't done anything like it before." There is little theoretical foundation for a normative articulation of how marketing strategy decisions should be made in situations of uncertainty.1 Uncertainty is an attribute not only of entrepreneurial settings but also of vir tually every environment in which marketing occurs today.
Drivers of this trend toward market volatility and uncer tainty include market fragmentation, competitive pressures, and new customer tastes (e.g., various kinds of ideological concerns, such as those for "green" products and services).2 The traditional market definition and segmentation using market research, based on what Vargo and Lusch (2006) call goods-dominant logic, is problematic when the market is nebulous and the data are anecdotal. Although their alter native paradigm, service-dominant logic, is extremely opti mistic about the role of the entrepreneur (as evidenced in the opening quotation of this article), it offers little norma tive guidance as to how to do marketing in the face of uncertainty.
In this article, we begin to fill the gap between existing marketing tools and the needs of managers who face uncer tainty by giving a representative task to people with related real-world expertise and comparing their strategies with those without such experience. The theoretical lens we use to focus our research design comes from entrepreneur ship?in particular, a cognitive science-based logic of entrepreneurial expertise called "effectuation." Effectuation has substantial overlaps and synergies with recent develop ments in marketing theory as represented in the conversa tions (e.g., Levy 2006 ) stemming from Vargo and Lusch's (2004, 2008a, b) exposition of service-dominant logic.
Throughout this article, we strive to clarify and connect key themes from both effectuation and service-dominant logic, with a view to cocreating value in the contribution of each We begin by introducing effectuation (Sarasvathy 2001a ) as a specific logic under the larger umbrella of deci sion making under uncertainty. We also trace effectuation's roots in the general literature on cognitive expertise and then outline its particular implications for marketing under uncertainty. We do this first through a review of psychologi cal research on expertise, followed by the development of hypotheses related to marketing under uncertainty, which we then empirically test against a contrasting sample of (1) managers with little entrepreneurial experience but training in normative marketing research and (2) expert entrepre neurs with significant new venture experience.
The crux of our conceptualization of "uncertainty" con sists of Knight's (1921) demarcation of it into known, unknown, and unknowable distributions. The known and the unknown, both in theory and in practice, are convention ally tackled using predictive techniques. Recent literature on entrepreneurial expertise (Read and Sarasvathy 2005) has claimed that the unknowable can be tackled using effec tual logic, which eschews prediction. Our aim is to take a first step toward applying this nonpredictive logic to mar keting in any firm?large or small, new or old?faced with making marketing decisions under uncertain, unknowable conditions. Therefore, we derive a set of propositions on how expert entrepreneurs using effectual logic and man agers schooled in contrasting predictive techniques differ entially solve marketing problems in uncertain situations.
We use comparative verbal protocol analysis to test our propositions (Ericsson 2006; Ericsson and Simon 1993) .
This method involves presenting expert entrepreneurs and a comparison sample of managers who have little entrepre neurial expertise with a hypothetical business scenario in which they think aloud continuously as they (1) envision products/services that people might pay for and (2) make specific marketing decisions, such as selection of target seg ments, channels, and pricing. The results show that while managers follow the predictive techniques presented in tra ditional marketing textbooks, expert entrepreneurs often invert these techniques through effectual logic. The funda mental difference in the way the two groups make decisions is embodied in a set of heuristics that is internally consistent and thus provides a clear, normative logic for making mar keting decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, this logic has much in common with the evolution of a new paradigm in the discipline of marketing.
Literature Review Effectuation: A Logic of Entrepreneurial Expertise
Developed as a baseline against which to evaluate entrepre neurial expertise, effectuation inverts several principles that are central to normative theories of predictive rationality. Particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, predictive rationality had been questioned. Simon's (1991) assault on its empirical validity, based on the cognitive bounds of the human mind, inspired research on heuristics and biases that deviated from rationality. Effectuation research was inspired by Simon's work and was developed in close collaboration with him (Sarasvathy 2002; Saras vathy and Simon 2000) . While bounded rationality has been construed by some researchers as a subset of predictive rationality, and the vast literature on heuristics and biases is considered a set of deviations from rationality, effectuation is an inversion of predictive rationality. In short, as Saras vathy and Simon (2000, p. 5) note, effectuation turns pre dictive rationality upside down to answer the following question: "Where do we find rationality when the environ ment does not independently influence outcomes or even rules of the game (Weick 1979) , the future is truly unpre dictable (Knight 1921) , and the decision-maker is unsure of his/her own preferences (March 1982) ?"
A static outline of the theory can be found in Saras vathy 's (2001a, b) work, and its dynamics have been worked out by Sarasvathy and Dew (2005a) . Applications of an effectual logic to firm strategy are examined in Wilt bank and colleagues ' (2006) work, and a book-length expo sition can be found in Sarasvathy's (2008) work. For the purposes of our study, we begin with a concise summary of effectuation, including five key constructs that differentiate it from normative theories on the basis of predictive ratio nality (see Table 1 ).
Effectuation inverts the fundamental principles, solution process, and overall logic of predictive rationality. Predic tive rationality rests on a logic of foresight?that is, to the extent that people can predict the future, they can control it. Effectuation rests on a logic of nonpredictive control?that is, to the extent that people can control the future, they do not need to predict it. Predictive rationality takes the envi ronment as largely outside the control of the decision maker, who therefore attempts to predict and adapt to changes in it. In an effectual view, the environment is endogenous to the actions of effectuators, who therefore attempt to cocreate it through commitments with a network of partner, investor, and customer stakeholders. Effectuation also specifies three types of intangible resources with which the effectuator cocreates new ends (i.e., new firms, products/services, and markets) through an iterative and interactive process of stakeholder acquisition. Figure 1 graphically presents this process, and we describe it in more detail in the next section. The point to note is that, as with service-dominant logic, effectual logic is "focused on intan gible resources, the co-creation of value, and relationships" (Vargo and Lusch 2004, p. 1) . Before we describe other overlaps and distinctions between effectuation and predic tive logic, we provide empirical examples to illustrate our theoretical exposition.
Predictive Rationality and Effectuation: Empirical
Examples
In Table 1 , we present a series of constructs from predictive rationality that are inverted in effectuation. A major thread of research in entrepreneurship sets out a predictive process that begins with the identification, recognition, or discovery of an opportunity, followed by a series of tasks that include
(1) developing a business plan based on (2) extensive mar ket research and (3) detailed competitive analyses, followed by (4) the acquisition of resources and stakeholders for implementing the plan, and then (5) adapting to the envi ronment as it changes over time with a view to (6) creating Who can and will create this opportunity with you?
And how can you gain their commitment? This means finding partners with complementary skills or assets and being willing to share in the upside with them so they will engage to create the opportunity with you.
Are you looking for positive surprises? Look at surprises not from the perspective of how they upset your existing plans but rather how you can shift actions so that you are, or will be, the beneficiary of a surprise.
Source: Sarasvathy and Dew (2005a) .
and sustaining a competitive advantage (Gartner 1985; Varadarajan and Jayachandran 1999) . In this predictive view, if a manager with little entrepreneurial expertise wanted to open a restaurant, he or she would begin by iden tifying a high-potential location, analyzing the competition in the area, identifying particular target segments, develop ing marketing strategies to fit the targets, obtaining neces sary funding, hiring the appropriate chef to develop the right menu, and then opening the doors to the restaurant. In contrast, as Figure 1 shows, effectuators would begin with the means available. According to who they are, what they know, and who they know, they would begin with a list of things they can afford to do. In the restaurant example, the effectual entrepreneur may or may not begin with a location; this would depend on who the effectuator is. If the effectuator is a cook, he or she may forgo identifying high potential locations and just hire him-or herself out as a chef who does house calls?it depends on what the chef can afford to invest in terms of money, time, and emotion. He or she would start by calling people he or she knows and putting together commitments from partners. For example, if the chef knew a grocery store owner, he or she might make dishes for the deli, or if the chef knew someone in the popular media, he or she might produce cooking videos, and so on. The nature of the venture depends on which stakeholders come on board and the contingencies that occur along the way. Using this stakeholder-dependent process, the effectuator sets in motion two contrasting cycles. The first is an expanding cycle that increases the resources available to the venture, and the second accretes constraints on the venture that converge into specific goals over time.
The result of the predictive process is determined by the initial "opportunity" identified and the adaptive changes made in marketing strategy over time to fit a preselected "market" and/or "vision." The end product in effectuation is fundamentally unpredictable at the beginning of the process. Indeed, the opportunity and even the market itself Marketing Under Uncertainty / 3
FIGURE 1
The Effectual Process (Sarasvathy and Dew 2005b) can be an outcome of and generated through the very process of effectuation. In other words, both market and opportunity are contingent on who comes on board and the actions and goals they enable and constrain; initial goals and visions of an opportunity seldom determine who comes on board or what resources are gathered under an effectual approach.
The exaggerated dichotomy we describe here creates a powerful theoretical separation between effectuation and predictive rationality. Empirically, both predictive and effectual processes may be at work in tandem. Therefore, we expect the data to contain decisions and actions that confound the two. Yet preliminary investigations in expert entrepreneurial decision making (Sarasvathy 2001b ) and early-stage investing (Wiltbank et al. 2009 ) indicate that strong patterns of effectual and predictive decisions can be isolated. In the current study, we apply these principles of effectual expertise to specific marketing problems under uncertainty. To do this, we need to grasp the methodological roots of effectuation in the larger literature on cognitive expertise and trace its theoretical connections to concep tions of uncertainty. We turn to these tasks next.
Expertise
Investigation of expertise using modern approaches began approximately 30 years ago, focusing on understanding chess masters (Chase and Simon 1973) .3 Despite expecta tions to the contrary, early studies of expert chess players concluded that intelligence had no correlation with chess mastery (Doll and Mayr 1987) . Expert players had learned unique ways of storing information (Butterworth 2006 ), perceiving problems, and generating solutions (Gobet and Charness 2006; Greeno and Simon 1988) . While early empirical efforts focused on chess, subsequent work has validated and expanded these findings to more dynamic and complex settings, such as medicine (Norman et al. 2006; Rikers et al. 2002) , fire fighting (Klein 1998) , software development (Sonnentag, Niessen, and Volmer 2006) , and consumer decision making (Alba and Hutchinson 1987) . Experience alone does not develop the unique decision making heuristics observed in experts (Camerer and John son 1991) . Evidence of superior performance is also neces sary, and though expert intelligence is not subject to age-related decline (Masunaga and Horn 2001) , expert decision-making heuristics can be negatively affected by biases, particularly those involving prediction of outcomes (Shanteau 1992) .
Managerial Expertise in Marketing
Scholarship in marketing has largely ignored the role of managerial expertise. In the earliest piece identified in our search, Larreche and Moinpour (1983, p. 119) show that experts "provide significantly better estimates than those obtained by other approaches," but they go on to lament that "the relevant issue, of course, is identifying 'experts.'" Given the strength of their findings, we were surprised to locate only four subsequent pieces on the topic. In chrono logical order, Sujan, Sujan, and Bettman (1988) demon strate more sophisticated knowledge structures in expert salespeople than in those with less experience. Perkins and Rao (1990) show that higher levels of uncertainty surround ing a problem increase the positive impact of experience on performance. Spence and Brucks (1997) argue that the greatest difference between expert and novice performance exists when a task is ill-structured but that performance is reasonably similar for well-structured and completely unstructured tasks. The most recent work we found on mar keting expertise argues that entrepreneurs with more experi ence are better able to make use of information inputs, such as marketing data and marketing management support sys tems, than their peers with less experience (VanBruggen, Smidts, and Wierenga 2001) .
Entrepreneurial Expertise in Uncertainty
According to Hebert and Link (1988) , since the earliest his tory of economic thought on entrepreneurship, it has been inextricably intertwined with uncertainty. In short, entrepre neurial expertise equals expertise in uncertainty. The canon ical thesis on this equality can be found in Knight's (1921) seminal work on the relationship between profit and unpre dictability. "Knightian" uncertainty removes the assumption that phenomena can be modeled and predictions can be accurately made based on historical data. Situations in which the past is not a reliable predictor of the future are where our work finds its home because effectuation pro vides heuristics that use the nonpredictive techniques that are characteristic of expert decision making in entrepre neurial settings. To apply effectuation to marketing under uncertainty, we need to connect both its roots in expertise and its branches in heuristics to hypothesize how to over come uncertainty in explicit marketing decisions. We take up this task in the next section.
Propositions
Effectuation, Expertise, and Marketing Strategy
The central concept in effectuation is the logic of nonpre dictive control. Therefore, our central proposition based on effectuation is related to the use of predictive information:
Expert entrepreneurs are likely to ignore or underweight pre dictive information in making marketing decisions in the new venture setting, instead relying on strategies that enable them to directly control, cocreate, and transform situations toward positive outcomes.
Merely on the basis of symmetry, we can argue that man agers without entrepreneurial expertise would do the oppo site?that is, rely on predictive information to make market ing decisions. This argument is also borne out by common sense and published evidence. Normative work, offered in textbooks (Kotier and Armstrong 1999) and popular litera ture (Ries and Trout 1985) , has largely followed the old dominant logic in marketing. This has meant applying pre dictive approaches based on market research and competi tive analysis to the development and execution of marketing strategies to achieve the highest possible returns and market share for existing and new ventures.
As Vargo and Lusch (2004) describe, at least part of the reason for the way concepts and theories in marketing have developed over the twentieth century is rooted in the macro economics of exchange of physical and manufactured goods and the microeconomics of profit maximization by the firm. Understandably, the empirical bases for this theo retical evolution are studies of large and/or established cor porations operating within well-defined or mature markets. Despite rising discontent in the last decade of the twentieth century, evidenced in calls for a new paradigm (Achrol 1991; Day and Montgomery 1999; Sheth and Parvatiyar 2000; Webster 1992 ), most basic marketing courses in busi ness schools continue to emphasize the four Ps (price, prod uct, promotion, and placement) and various tools designed to predict demand better and analytically capture predeter mined markets instead of the cocreation of both through innovative deployments of op?rant resources in ongoing relationships between marketing stakeholders.
In summary, although we cannot be sure what the aver age person on the street, utterly unschooled in marketing, might do when faced with a marketing decision, we can 3De Groot ([1946] 1978) began sporadic work on the topic as early as 1946.
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As our next task, we attempt to provide sturdy legs to support this broad central hypothesis, legs consisting of par ticular heuristics that are relevant to marketing decisions under uncertainty. We draw from both the larger literature on general expertise and the more specific literature on entrepreneurial expertise. The first four propositions stem from an integration of effectuation with the expertise litera ture. The final three relate effectuation heuristics to predic tive principles of marketing. After we describe the data, analysis, and results involved in testing these hypotheses, we turn to an in-depth discussion of how an alternative set of prescriptions for marketing under uncertainty based on effectual logic may cohere and cumulate with recent new developments, including Vargo and Lusch's (2004) notion of a service-dominant logic, Hunt and Morgan's (1997) resource-based arguments, Jaworski and Kohli's (2006) cocreation perspective, Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml's (2004) conceptualization of customer equity, and Berthon and John's (2006) seven value dimensions of interactions as per ceived by clients.
Hypotheses Based on Expertise in General
Market research. The first proposition stems directly from our central hypothesis based on effectuation; namely, expert entrepreneurs likely ignore predictive information. This proposition is reinforced by the literature on expertise in general. Experience and deliberate practice are the sources from which experts develop much of their knowl edge (Ericsson 2006) . In contrast, those without experience rehearse skills in the context of "classroom" or practice problems, divorced from the actual domain of decision making (Schenk, Vitalari, and Davis 1998) . This distinction is critical. Managers with limited exposure to real-world problem solving have little of the episodic knowledge that is at the disposal of expert entrepreneurs, resulting in dis tinctly different problem-solving approaches. Because expert entrepreneurs spend more time trying to understand decision problems and have refined perceptual abilities based on intensive practice and familiarization in their domain (Hutton and Klein 1999) , they are more likely to define carefully the relevant features of decision prob lems and, consequently, are less likely to rely on predictive information. Experts also process and organize significant bodies of knowledge (Glaser 1996) necessary to make good decisions without a great reliance on external inputs, par ticularly predictive ones (Rikers et al. 2002) . Instead, experts have learned to filter information automatically from external sources (Leifer 1991) , validating it against patterns from previous experiences (Chase and Simon 1973) .
In marketing management, this limited reliance on pre dictive information is an important factor distinguishing expert entrepreneurs. They have an ability to judge typical ity on the basis of their store of patterns built over years of deliberate practice. They recognize environments in which the value of predictive information is low, both because such information is perishable in fast-moving uncertain environments and because this information does not account for the impact of actions they will take (Van Heerde, Dekimpe, and Putsis 2005). As George Bernard Shaw once said, "In literature, the ambition of the novice is to acquire the literary language; the struggle of the adept is to get rid of it." Similarly, in uncertain situations, managers without domain-specific experience learn the textbook tools of market research, while expert entrepreneurs seek alterna tives. Therefore, although some managers may have great stores of semantic or factual knowledge of a domain, they may lack practical experience in dealing with uncertainty. Given the predominant emphasis of research and textbook literature on using predictive information, such as historical market data to build sophisticated models, we expect the following: P] (market research): When making marketing decisions in an uncertain business situation, people higher in entrepre neurial expertise are more likely to be skeptical about mar ket data, while those lower in entrepreneurial expertise are more likely to take market data as given and credible.
Prior experience and analogical reasoning. The knowl edge mechanisms that expert entrepreneurs substitute for market research is the subject of our next proposition. Through deliberate practice, experts have, among other things, developed a database of patterns that they can access when solving future problems (Gobet and Simon 1996) . The question is whether entrepreneurial experts will actu ally apply this unique knowledge to the modeling of solu tions for problems in the uncertain situations of product development and market creation as do chess and computer programming experts to their tasks (Adelson 1984) . From prior work, we know that experts automatically store infor mation according to outcomes (Ericsson and Kintsch 1995) .
Because experts match and recognize stored patterns against existing situations (Reingold et al. 2001) , they are likely to retrieve strategies they know they can implement (Kalakoski and Saariluoma 2001) . For example, in their think-aloud protocol study of real-world industrial design ers, Dahl and Moreau (2002) show the importance of pat tern recognition and analogical reasoning in new product development. From a summary of this work, which includes variation in the indicators of expertise, we expect that while managers are likely to use problem data as the basis for tak ing action, expert entrepreneurs build strategies that draw on analogies to prior experience. Formally, P2 (prior experience): When making marketing decisions in an uncertain business situation, people higher in entrepre neurial expertise are more likely to use analogical reason ing based on experience than those lower in entrepreneur ial expertise.
Affordable loss. Expert entrepreneurs are also likely to differ from managers in how they employ available resources. Effectuation suggests that expert entrepreneurs know through past experience and actual practice that suc cess cannot be predicted when facing uncertainty but that the occurrence of failure can be significantly controlled (Sarasvathy 2001a; Sarasvathy and Menon 2003 In general, experts have acquired a highly adapted set of cognitive skills and a deep understanding of the nature of their own problem domain (Bettman and Sujan 1987; Erics son and Charness 1994) . Because of the uncertainty associ ated with tasks in the domain of new firm, product, or mar ket creation, how decision makers frame problems is critical. Studies of the organization of information by experts and novices show that experts approach problem sit uations with more understanding than novices. Experts are more likely to frame problems comprehensively, using a top-down framework or schema, within which they contex tualize specific decisions and link them to other decisions. In contrast, novices tend not to frame problems within a conceptual scheme but rather approach them from the bottom-up and according to surface characteristics rather than their underlying structures (Mackay and Elam 1992 Market and product. Expert entrepreneurs' experience and practice in uncertain new venture settings teaches them that market targets and product offerings can be consider ably transformed along the path from concept to accep tance. Thus, value proposition change is a pattern that experts are accustomed to and actively embrace (Sarasvathy and Kotha 2001) . In contrast to this view is the textbook prescription from the old dominant logic in marketing that advises beginning with the selection of a target market for a predefined product or service and proceeding to build ele ments of price, promotion, and placement around that prod uct or service (Kotier and Armstrong 1999) . Theoretical arguments for feedback loops in which the product is gener ated by the process (Vargo and Lusch 2004) and even exhortations to move to a network perspective (Achrol and Kotier 1999) exist. Yet empirical evidence demonstrates that adherence to well-defined product offerings is still the norm; for example, Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and Staelin (2006) explain why marketing managers persist with their offering even when the product has failed in the market. Consequently, we expect the following:
P5 (market and product): In an uncertain business situation, people higher in entrepreneurial expertise are more likely to consider more alternative markets, even if the option necessitates product or strategy change, while those lower in entrepreneurial expertise are more likely to accept target markets and products as given.
Pricing. Confounding prescriptions from traditional marketing literature make pricing a dilemma. On the one hand, producers have incentives to underprice products early on in the hope of penetrating the market, driving adoption (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Rogers 1995) , and cap turing value later in the cycle. On the other hand, they have contradictory incentives to "skim" profits from early adopters who are typically less price sensitive (Kotier and Armstrong 1999; Nagle and Holden 1994) . What is likely to separate expert entrepreneurs from less experienced man agers is both the process by which they arrive at the pricing decision and the outcome of the decision. Expert entrepre neurs approach the pricing issue "locally," according to information gained from their interactions with stakehold ers (Sarasvathy 2001a) . They learn the value that each cus tomer derives from an evolving value proposition and how this value is derived, and they generalize price as the process unfolds. Because managers with less entrepreneur ial experience are likely to develop pricing based on seg mentation ideas and the target market they preselect, their pricing approach needs to be relevant to the chosen cus tomer segment. Indeed, pricing is often a factor that describes the segment itself. Consequently, managers are likely to set prices in terms of a "lowest common denomi nator" for a given segment, while expert entrepreneurs are likely to price on the basis of the highest level of value they have uncovered through interactions with individual cus tomers (see Berthon and John 2006) .
P6 (price):
In an uncertain business situation, people higher in entrepreneurial expertise are more likely to price higher to capitalize on the value they have identified to a specific customer (skim pricing), while those lower in entrepre neurial expertise are more likely to price lower to pene trate entire target segments (penetration pricing).
Channel. Effectuation predicts that expert entrepreneurs are cognizant that successful ventures involve complete and complex webs of stakeholder relationships, with stakehold ers bringing resources and ideas to a new venture as well as obligations (Sarasvathy 2001a) . We expect that expert entrepreneurs will build stakeholder relationships directly, one step at a time, as part of the process of creating a mar ket, firm, or product. A result of this effort is that experts will generate rich, firsthand knowledge related to the effort and will quickly have a sense of whether the business has real promise. However, this practice will also color the way they approach distribution of the product because relation ships will create the market. As a result, we expect that the channel strategy the expert entrepreneurs use will be contin gent on partnerships and therefore will be relatively narrow. In contrast, managers will sell to as many segments as they rationalize to be profitable through channels that have broad reach and appeal.
P7 (channel):
In an uncertain business situation, people higher in entrepreneurial expertise are more likely to develop a focused channel strategy around partnerships to serve a narrow customer group, while those lower in entrepreneur ial expertise are less focused, selling to more segments through more channels and being less dependent on partnerships.
The Study Method First, we operationalized expertise as a set of criteria for sample selection. Second, we developed a research instru ment to present an uncertain situation and to capture the information-seeking tasks involved in discovering and/or creating the market for a new product. Third, participants completed the think-aloud task, and their concurrent verbal protocols were collected. Fourth, we coded, analyzed, and reported protocols.
Protocol Analysis
Because our objective was to understand the heuristic dif ferences in decision making associated with entrepreneurial expertise, we selected the method of concurrent verbal pro tocol analysis. Pioneered largely in psychological studies of expertise, this approach calls for analysis of the transcripts of participants thinking aloud during problem-solving tasks. As designed, the intent of the method was to gain insight into real-time cognitive processing (Ericsson and Simon 1980) , initially using the game of chess (Charness 1989) . The method was designed to minimize the bias associated with retrospective recall and to gain visibility into the decision-making steps often obscured using stimulus response methods, which analyze only decision outcomes, not processes.4 Some examples of protocol analysis studies in entrepreneurship include venture capitalist investment selection criteria (Hall and Hof er 1993) and entrepreneurial decision framing ). Examples in marketing include consumer choice processes (Cooper-Martin 1993), pretesting questionnaires (Bolton 1993) , brand extension (Boush and Loken 1991) , and retail sales projections (Cox and Summers 1987) .
Participants
Our study includes a sample of 27 expert entrepreneurs and 37 managers with little entrepreneurial experience, with a robustness check using 34 executives. We operationalized expert entrepreneurs as having founded one or more firms and having remained with at least one of the ventures through ten years of operation, the initial public offering, and the achievement of a minimum of $200 million in annual revenues. These criteria ensured that our expert entrepreneurs spent the required amount of time in domain specific deliberate practice, achieved an extraordinary level of performance in a situation, and thus could be considered experts (Ericsson and Lehmann 1996) . We identified these experts by combining a list of the 100 most successful entrepreneurs from 1960 to 1985 (Silver 1985) and the list of national winners of the Entrepreneurs of the Year awards, compiled by Ernst & Young. The expert entrepreneur sam ple contains broad industry diversity, ranging from trans portation to medical devices and consumer products, and all the entrepreneurs are men. The sample is 90% American, ages range between 40 and 82 years, and two-thirds have advanced degrees. On average, participants founded seven firms.
Our requirements for a comparison sample of managers included (1) having sufficient knowledge to address the questions in the research instrument but (2) not having entrepreneurial expertise. We selected 37 graduate students in business administration. Participants are 97% American, ages range between 26 and 46 years, and their experience lies primarily in large organizations. As with the experts, they have diverse industry backgrounds, including acquisi tions and procurement, supply and logistics, human resources, operations, and medical services. Only 1 had started multiple ventures (two ventures), and 87% had never been part of a start-up.
The choice of MBA students as a comparison sample follows a precedent of using students in expertise experi ments from psychology (Lehmann and Norman 2005) as well as in marketing research (Armstrong and Collopy 4This is particularly problematic for experiments that are suffi ciently simple so that a participant can generate the solution in his or her head (Ericsson and Simon 1993) . If the solution can be gen erated in a single step, the researcher will fail to see into the "black box" and will consequently not gain insight into the process of cognitive processing. Because our scenario has no correct answer and offers participants a nearly infinite solution set, we believe that we have mitigated this risk, thus gaining meaningful insight into the heuristics of expert entrepreneurs. We appreciate a reviewer for suggesting this. 1996). To conduct an additional robustness check on the uniqueness of our expert entrepreneur sample?namely, to ensure that the differences we observed are indeed due to their entrepreneurial expertise?we validated our findings against a second sample of 34 executives with an average of more than 14 years of experience and senior positions at major multinational firms spanning functions, industries, and geographies but without any significant new venture experience. Business executives differ from expert entrepre neurs on all the same dimensions as the students, except for pricing and use of personal selling.
Research Instrument
Participants were administered the instrument individually, in a standardized format. Then, they were provided a detailed written description of an imaginary game of entre preneurship called "Venturing." After participants finished reading the description, they were presented with the fol lowing five written questions and asked to read the ques tions aloud; this ensured that they all experienced the ques tions in the same order and format:
1. Who could be your potential customers for this product?
2. Who could be your potential competitors for this product?
3. What information would you seek about potential cus tomers and competitors? List questions you would want answered.
4. How will you find out this information? What kind of mar ket research would you do?
5. What do you think are the growth possibilities for this company?
After responding to the first five questions, participants were presented with two pages of market research informa tion related to the opportunity for the Venturing product. After reviewing the information, participants received the following three additional written questions, again in a stan dardized format and order:
1. Which market segment/segments will you sell your product to?
2. How will you price your product?
3. How will you sell to your selected market segment/ segments?
A professional service recorded and transcribed the entire interaction. All participants were asked to commit a minimum of 30 minutes to the experimental task. All the participants completed the interaction without time pres sure, and members of both groups remarked that they found both the scenario and the questions to be engaging and rep resentative of the kinds of issues they faced or might expect to face in the context of creating a new opportunity.
Coding
We developed a coding scheme to extract relevant variables and counts using the helix process that Ericsson and Simon (1993) describe. This process generates scheme items along a particular axis, such as the dimensions of expertise in gen eral and marketing decisions in particular, using sequential coding iterations. The iterations began with one of the prin cipal investigators randomly selecting two expert entrepre neur and two manager protocol transcripts and creating a list of specific scheme items. The same researcher expanded the list by adding items from other protocol transcripts, test ing, adding, deleting, and refining items iteratively until new protocol transcripts yielded no modifications. The con verged scheme was then tested by two other principal inves tigators, who used the coding scheme to recode the same protocol transcripts independently. During these iterations, we made three minor modifications, resulting in an inven tory of variable descriptions and operationalizations (see Table 2 ).
To check interrater reliability, an independent coder recoded both the expert entrepreneur and the manager pro tocols using the scheme in Table 2 . The two sets of codings were compared for reliability. The first pass at independent codings revealed strong agreement on all but two variables. Further clarification of the variable definitions between the principle investigators and the independent coder resulted in a strong mean interrater agreement across all variables in this study of .78, with no agreement less than .62, calcu lated using the proportional reduction in loss (PRL)
approach (see Rust and Cooil 1994) . The PRL interrater agreement scores appear for each variable in Table 3 . We performed analysis of variance or chi-square tests depend ing on whether the variables were scale or dichotomous.
Results

P1 (Market Research)
We expected that managers with less entrepreneurial experi ence would be more likely to take market research data as given, while expert entrepreneurs would be more likely to question it. We looked for comments that reflected skepti cism regarding the data presented in the scenario or in mar ket data in general, and we tagged participants who made such comments "nonbelievers." "Believers" did not ques tion the data. An example of a nonbeliever's transcript is as follows:
Expert Entrepreneur 15: I don't win much from market research. It's always been very bad in my projects.
Interviewer: Very, very bad, or don't you believe in it?
Which one? This approach is in contrast to that of Manager 10, a believer who accepts the numbers and is willing to base his market strategy choice simply on their magnitude:
I am looking at the market here; it talks about estimated dollar value of instructional technology [being] $1.7 bil lion. You got the dollar of the interactive game, which is $800 million, and both expect to earn 20%. So both are good markets. Obviously, $1.7 billion is grabbing my attention because it seems like a bigger market, and [we] would probably be able to make more money in that mar ket just from looking at it.
A chi-square comparison of the expert entrepreneur and manager groups revealed that expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely not to believe market data (p < .001), in support of Pj. Check off channels they used: Direct sales.
Check off channels they used: Direct sales: "I will personally call" (other option was "I will recruit salespeople"). P3 (Affordable Loss)
As with Pj and P2, we did not ask any specific questions about cost so as not to prime participants on the topic. We also did not present participants with a fixed amount of money to work with in the scenario. Instead, we analyzed the transcript data, looking for comments and questions regarding the amount of money available to the project and for decisions in which cost was a factor. We found that expert entrepreneurs were significantly (p < .001) more likely to consider available financial resources when mak ing decisions regarding the scenario, in support of P3. In the following transcript excerpts, Expert Entrepreneur 11 con siders cost three times (italics are added to highlight these mentions) as he makes a channel decision; in contrast, Manager 10 is drawn to the opportunity associated with the greatest possible financial upside, with no mention of cost:
Expert Entrepreneur 11 : So the Internet seems to really be actually a surprisingly effective way to communicate at a pretty low cost. So the bookstores, that seems very, quite expensive, with a lot more support needed. And direct to educational institutions seems also a lot more complex ... Manager 10: I tend to want to look over the information here a little more just to get a better feel. I guess the biggest thing I want to focus on is, as an entrepreneur, you want to go up with a product that you think is going to earn you the most money, revenue, and profits.
P4 (Decision Framing)
We expected expert entrepreneurs to think holistically about building a business rather than simply answering the ques tions in the scenario. We counted the number of thoughts a participant offered that related to the business but were out side the scope of questions presented by the scenario to determine the degree to which participants went beyond the data to make decisions. We found that expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely to think holistically about the scenario (p < .001) than managers. In further support of P4, we also counted the number of thoughts a participant had about long-term issues regarding the business. Because we did not ask about long-term issues, this also reflected the degree to which participants thought beyond the scenario and envisioned the business as a whole. As we expected, expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely (p = .002) to be concerned about long-term issues than man agers. In the following quotation, Expert Entrepreneur 25 references long-term issues and uses an analogy to trace a possible trajectory of how his venture would endure over time:
Again I'm looking at a long-term play here. That market, if we were doing an analysis of institutional, instructional technology market and the interactive simulation market, let's go back and look at some examples. The Apple com puter is an excellent example of how you can come into a market, get great market play, and then blow out, for all the reasons I said I wanted to avoid. I want to have flexi bility, I want to be able to deal in multicultural situations, I want it in fact to be current?so that it doesn't become stale.
P5 (Market and Product)
We found that expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely than managers to identify or pursue markets not men tioned in the Venturing product scenario (p < .001), even if that choice implied a change to the product articulated in the scenario, in support of P5. The key to this difference was the way expert entrepreneurs chose to interact with stake holders to redefine and transform the initial product. Begin ning with exactly the same hypothetical product, the 27 expert entrepreneurs created 28 different and unique market definitions with product adaptations to match. Conversely, the 37 managers were less likely to reformulate the concept of the market, generating only 12 new market definitions. Furthermore, expert entrepreneurs were more open to considering new markets at least in part because they were not as tied to the articulation of the product as presented in the scenario. Although we could not find a reliable way to operationalize this difference quantitatively, we present three quotations from expert entrepreneurs that reflect their willingness to make product changes, enabling them to con sider new market definitions.
Expert Entrepreneur 6: Find out actually who your cus tomers are, and from that, you might change your adver tising approach and change the design of the product.
Expert Entrepreneur 11 : Find out how the training opera tions of larger companies, how they inform themselves about what kind of courses they can offer, and the deci sion process they go through, and the kind of criteria they set in terms of what a product of this nature should look like.
Expert Entrepreneur 18: One of the ways I find that you get buy-in to anything is to make the potential customer feel that they have a part in developing the product.
These quotations illustrate three mechanisms expert entrepreneurs use to reconceptualize product in uncertain situations: customers, process, and partners. Other mecha nisms may be at work as well. We do not attempt to deter mine exhaustively all possible mechanisms and their poten tial relationship to the reconsideration of target markets and products here; instead, we offer this as a potential avenue for further research.
P6 (Price)
To examine the initial price preferences of expert entrepre neurs and managers with less entrepreneurial experience, we first looked for explicit strategy remarks about pricing decisions. We identified statements that reflected a strategy of pricing high to maximize profit and coded these as skim strategies. We also identified statements that reflected a strategy of pricing low to drive early product adoption and coded these as penetration strategies. We found that expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely to base pricing decisions on a skim pricing strategy and that managers were significantly more likely to base pricing decisions on a penetration pricing strategy (p -.002). This significant dif ference was evident in the quantitative prices as well (p -.046), for which the mean expert entrepreneur price was $157 and the mean manager price was $75, in support of P6.
We present two quotations: one from Manager 3, who dis cussed setting penetration pricing for a market share, and one from Expert Entrepreneur 3, who articulated entry with a skim strategy:
Manager 3: I think that probably given the primary data, [I'd] probably price it in the $50 to $100 range. I would want to get a higher percentage of people at first to be able to take, especially if it is offered through the Internet ini tially. You have got to be able to keep the price down to get people interested.
Expert Entrepreneur 3: All the traffic will bear;... no question you are going to charge as much as you can;... looking for the inflection point on the curve as to when you're going to get the higher volumes. Sometimes it pays to try to figure out a two tier pricing;... so you have the platinum game and you have the B-average game in some form or another.
P7 (Channel)
To analyze channel choice, we began by coding all channel strategies according to the categories in Table 2 . To deter mine whether a participant based channel strategy around an individual customer or a whole segment, we considered the channel in which either choice was viable?namely, direct sales. We first examined the difference between expert entrepreneurs and managers with less entrepreneurial experience on their predisposition toward direct selling in general and found no significant difference (p = .954). Con sidering only participants who chose to sell direct, we ana lyzed thoughts describing a strategy that involved the founder doing the initial selling. The difference between the groups on a strategy of personal, direct selling showed that expert entrepreneurs were significantly more likely to make initial sales themselves, while managers were more likely to engage a sales force to approach a segment (p = .024). We Further support of P7 is offered by our analysis of dif ferences in how expert entrepreneurs and managers use partnerships. We counted the number of thoughts related to partnership activities and found that expert entrepreneurs were significantly (p = .001) more likely to incorporate partnerships into their decision making as they solved prob lems during the scenario. Although we did not find any sig nificant difference between the groups with respect to the number of channels chosen (p = .864), we found that man agers were significantly more likely to select more seg ments than expert entrepreneurs (p = .019). In summary, we find a majority of support for the components of P7, except for the number of channels chosen.
To summarize the results, expert entrepreneurs are sig nificantly more likely to use heuristics based on an effectual logic in making marketing decisions under uncertainty. In contrast, managers with little entrepreneurial experience tend to rely on predictive approaches prescribed in market ing textbooks.
Implications and Conclusion
Effectual logic provides an internally consistent set of pre scriptions for marketing decision making under uncertainty (see Table 1 ), which contrast significantly with marketing textbook prescriptions. In all fairness, however, we must acknowledge at least two issues in interpreting this evi dence: (1) Most, if not all, textbook prescriptions are derived from studies of marketing within large, well established corporations and not in entrepreneurial settings, and (2) there are several strong movements in marketing scholarship away from the old dominant logic underlying textbook prescriptions and toward exactly the sort of princi ples and heuristics advocated by an effectual logic.5 We out line a few of these and discuss one in particular.
Effectual Logic: Coherence with Cocreational Theories of Marketing
In a foreword to the recent book edited by Vargo and Lusch (2006) , Webster (p. xiii) 
avers the following:
For the past decade or so, marketing thought leaders, both in academe and business, have expressed increasing con cerns about the state of marketing, both as a science and as a practice, and the strained relationship between the two. There is more agreement about the nature of the problems facing the field than there is about required changes and future direction.
In the ensuing discussion, we keep in mind the ongoing and unfinished nature of this conversation and offer our contributions as exciting possibilities for profitable collabo ration with the works in progress on entrepreneurial effectu ation rather than as competing, alternative theories. Expert entrepreneurs' use of effectual logic both coheres with and lends credence to several recent insights from marketing and the resultant angst toward the field. In a nutshell, effec tual logic is relational (Arndt 1979; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Macneil 1980; Morgan and Hunt 1994) , network ori ented (Achrol and Kotier 1999) , equity driven (Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml 2004) , and cocreational (Jaworski and Kohli 2006) . In line with Vargo and Lusch (2004) , effectual logic is also human centered and op?rant resource based. Hunt and Morgan (1997) identify a large slate of resources, including both operand and op?rant resources, and posit the resource-advantage theory as a candidate for a general theory of competition. Resource-advantage theory is a close cousin of the resource-based view (RBV) in strategic management. In many ways, effectual logic is indeed resource based, but it differs from both the RBV and the resource-advantage theory in important ways. Recently, the RBV has come under criticism because it uses "valu able" as one of the characteristics that defines a resource.6
Resource-advantage theory appears to be susceptible to a similar critique. For example, consider Hunt and Mad havaram's (2006, p. 100) definition: "A firm resource is any tangible or intangible entity available to the firm that enables it to produce efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has value for some market segment(s)." This is dangerously close to being fodder for the criticism "that bad marketing is also marketing" (Levy 2006, p. 62) . Effectual logic attempts to sidestep this problem by explicitly assum ing any and all means at hand?regardless of whether they turn out to be valuable ex post?as possible inputs into the process. For example, new ventures frequently use waste or slack resources (i.e., those perceived as having little or no economic value, such as the time and effort of stay-at home mothers in the case of Mary Kay Cosmetics) as key op?rant resources to develop new business models. More recently "waste equals food" has become a mantra for 5At the same time, neither uncertainty nor entrepreneurship is afforded much mind space, even in the conversation about the evo lution of a new dominant logic for marketing. For example, these two words did not even make it into the subject index in Vargo and Lusch's (2006) book, and the only mention of either we found was contained in the quotation at the beginning of this article. or otherwise, embodied in the resources themselves, whether operand or op?rant. In this, the effectual RBV is procedural rather than substantive.
Resource-advantage theory, similar to its cousin RBV, posits relationships between a firm's resources and its posi tion in the competitive landscape. Dynamism enters into the landscape as firms struggle to obtain resources that are either unique or relatively difficult to imitate or move and therefore serve as sources of sustainable competitive advan tages. As Hunt and Morgan (2006, p. 72) Expert entrepreneurs do not consider resource value exogenous to the cocreation process. They are well aware that cocreation provides financial and psychological owner ship to all stakeholders engaged in the process and often ends up making even mundane resources more valuable. In the age of the World Wide Web, this has become inescapable; customers of firms such as Netscape, Google, and Amazon.com literally purchased equity to make them blockbuster initial public offerings. The phenomena of open source and crowd-sourcing offer further testaments to the notion that cocreation increases the value of the resources of the firm, be it share value, brand value, or the social and reputational value of its intangible resources. Effectuators explicitly embrace and leverage this endogeneity of resource value to the dynamics of the cocreational process. Here, it is the cooperative shaping of the market rather than a competitive scramble for (predicted to be) valuable resources that drives industry dynamics.
In this connection, effectual expertise poses a nuanced but important challenge to an unstated assumption in cur rent marketing theorizing that may be worth highlighting:
cocreation not only with customers and suppliers but also with a variety of other stakeholders. Common to almost all current marketing research, including the recent collection of articles in Vargo and Lusch (2006) , is the existence of a class of people exclusively called "customers." Marketing scholars tend to ignore or, in some cases, assume away the notion that customers may play multiple or ambiguous roles (i.e., they may also be investors or suppliers or may not themselves know if they are or want to be customers at all).
By focusing on a cocreation process that includes any and all people as potential stakeholders and allows negotia tion and renegotiation between self-selected stakeholders as the way to determine subsequent roles and relationships in the growing network, effectuation offers a practical process for tackling both role and goal ambiguities in value cocre ation. This implies that it may be profitable for researchers to consider how they might generalize marketing insights to stakeholders as a whole. In a recent article on managing the cocreation process, Payne, Storbacka, and Frow (2008, p. 94) echo this call for further research on "the role of non supplier partners and intermediaries in co-creation."
In conclusion, although the exact nature and extent of effectuation's contribution to the development of a new paradigm in marketing is an empirical question, there is a prima facie case for considering its theoretical contribution to the field. In addition, there are significant managerial implications.
Managerial Implications
Here, we return to the marketing student knocking on the professor's door and consider how we should respond to the question of designing winning strategies under uncertainty.
Note that the use of effectual logic is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving marketing or entre preneurial success. Yet the findings from the current study are not without normative implications for performance.
The findings regarding market research and pricing are particularly striking in this regard. Not only are the specific heuristics addressing market research and pricing consistent with a relational and cocreational, rather than a transac tional, view of marketing, but they also provide distinct mechanisms for keeping costs down and pushing revenues up. Therefore, regardless of any exogenous probability of success or failure, they work in the directions we would want them to work with regard to endogenous variables. Moreover, when we take into account that cocreational and nonpredictive aspects of effectuation tend to endogenize more variables than traditional approaches that take those variables as exogenous, there is room for optimism in terms of our pedagogical and practical recommendations.
Market research. Our finding that expert entrepreneurs are skeptical of market research suggests that marketing managers facing uncertainty should fully consider the value of alternatives to conventional market research activities.
Expert entrepreneurs replace market research with cocre ational or partnership strategies with potential customers, suppliers, and investors who they work with directly. They view all four Ps as iterative and interactive outcomes of a cocreational process driven by self-selected stakeholders that include customers. We speculate that this process gen erates several implications.
First, by interacting with and "listening in" (Urban and H?user 2004) to specific stakeholders, not only are compa nies in the initial stages of new market, product, and service development more likely to generate novel information, but the kind of information they generate is also more likely to be useful and valuable. Compared with traditional market research, this increases the likelihood of creating realistic new market opportunities because firms learn at every step what stakeholders will actually commit to and?just as important?what they will not commit to. This enables the firm to fail fast on poor product and service ideas and to bring good ideas to market sooner. Second, rather than investing time, money, and manage rial effort up front in market research, new ventures can move directly to selling a potential or actual product or ser vice to customers on the basis of affordable loss. Here again, an implication is faster feedback at lower cost than market research activity would typically enable. Further more, in many instances, stakeholders may pay for or con tribute to the costs of creating the early-stage product or service, which distributes risk and cost among stakeholders, thus lowering both to the new venture. Finally, to the extent that each stakeholder also invests only what he or she can afford to lose, the firm may be able to carry out more itera tions of the product or service development process, thus increasing experimentation and consequent generation of valuable novelty at lower cost.
Pricing. No strategy probably dominates start-ups run by managers with little entrepreneurial experience more than promising customers "more for less"?that is, more valuable products and services at lower prices. This conjec ture is borne out in our study; such managers consistently price lower than expert entrepreneurs. Expert entrepreneurs have learned that more for less is not a good pricing strategy for new products and services. We speculate that this has several implications for practicing managers.
First, in the case of new or uncertain product/service offerings, customers are not likely to have been exposed to prior price information. The initial pricing for a new prod uct or service will act as a reference for the niche (Mazum dar, Raj, and Sinha 2005). Using a negotiated pricing process (rather than predictive pricing) is more likely to result in new ventures establishing an accurate range for a high reference price that customers still perceive as fair (Bolton and Lemon 1999) . Second, by directly negotiating with early customers and achieving bidirectionality and mutual satisfaction in pricing decisions (Oliver 2006) , the company locks in cus tomer commitment not only to the value proposition but also to the new venture itself, thereby increasing the proba bility that customers will become repeat purchasers and per haps active promoters of the company's offerings (Benda pudi and Leone 2003) .
Further Research
Before we conclude the article on a high note, it would be worthwhile to specify certain limitations and contingencies on the use and misuse of effectual logic. Because this study is an early step in understanding effectuation, rather than speculating on where these boundaries may lie, we tackle these through an examination of future research possibilities.
One of our core findings suggests that expert entrepre neurs are skeptical of market research. A limitation of our study is that we did not examine the moderating effects of variables such as product type, customer target, or competi tive intensity. Further research might examine the condi tions and approaches in which market research improves new venture success. For example, although market research is not positively correlated to performance for radi cal innovation, it may be beneficial for entrepreneurs to conduct market research if the new firm is creating incre mental products that meet existing market needs. Further more, although assessing segment size may be useful to a new venture that intends to offer a mass-produced standard product, it may be irrelevant to a new service venture that can customize each and every engagement.
Further research could also investigate effective strate gies and targets for cocreation. For example, although much literature has examined funding partners, a critical supplier may be a more important cocreation partner for a new ven ture, which typically lacks both resources and expertise (Song and DiBenedetto 2008) . Suppliers that are involved early in the product design, testing, and commercialization phases can make early investments in equipment, tools, and training; can identify design errors early on; can observe what works and what does not; and will be aware of the market launch and product positioning strategy from the outset. However, the new venture also lacks prior experi ence with potential suppliers and thus may not necessarily be a desirable partner from the supplier's point of view. How can the new venture with no prior relationships gain commitments from a key supplier in the cocreation process?
Further research might usefully unpack the complex and integrative nature of precommitments and cocreational relationships.
Conclusion
We have shown a relationship between expert entrepreneurs and unique, effectual approaches to decision making under uncertainty that is not evident in their manager peers. This is relevant because virtually all categories of products and services now modeled, analyzed, and predicted were once novel and uncertain. Even predictable markets can change abruptly as a result of disruptive inventions, regulatory actions, and events outside the control of even the best mar keters. From our work, we extracted some common deci sion strategies of expert entrepreneurs faced with uncertain business problems and, from these findings, made infer ences to aid our understanding about the genesis of prod ucts, firms, and markets.
In summary, effectual logic not only overlaps with the ways marketing theories are evolving but also brings texture to the entrepreneurial spirit of marketing. Marketing is cen tral to creating valuable new ventures both at the level of individual stakeholders in the firm and for the economy and society as a whole. Yet scholarship in entrepreneurial finance is better developed than research at the interface of entrepreneurship and marketing. Furthermore, marketing as a science finds itself in exciting times, caught up in the heady vortex of developing a new dominant paradigm. Per haps a more detailed understanding of how expert entrepre neurs make marketing decisions will help coalesce some of the elements of the new paradigm. The results from the cur rent study relating effectual logic to marketing under uncer tainty hark back to the quotation from Vargo and Lusch (2006, p. 53) at the beginning of this article: "In this sense, one of the most important op?rant resources in society and the economy is the entrepreneurial spirit."
